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1 Introduction and overview1
In December 1991 the Tax Commssion, appointed by the Government of
Tanzania, offered a proposal for reform of the Tanzanian tax system? The
replacement of the current sa1es tax by a value-added tax (V A T) is the Tax
Commssion's central recommendation in the domain of indirect taxation (URT,
1991a: chapter 12). With sa1es and excise taxes on domestie goods and services
being the large st single source of tax revenue (Fjeldstad, 1995b), this proposal
implies that V AT is regarded as the mainstay of Tanzania's future revenue system.
The Government announced in the 1992 (June) Budget Speech its intention to
introduce V AT in Januar 1994. To this day, however, little progress has been
made in this area.
It is not entirely clear how the introduction of a value-added tax became an issue
in the Tax Commission's report. It appears that the Government and its
representatives in the Commssion, were commtted to the introduction of V AT,
apparently with the argument that a V AT would contribute to an over-all increase
in tax revenue for the state. Basu and Morrissey (1993: 19) report that it is "clear
that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to some degree supported, if they did
not actually initiate, this policy objective". Although several members of the
Commssion were opposed to introducing a V AT, largely because it was seen as
administratively difficult to implement and no obvious improvement of the
existing system, these reservations were not explicitly expressed in the report. 3
Is Tanzania ready for a value-added tax? The purpose of this paper is to answer
this question, to discuss possible obstacles and alternatives, and to consider how
a V A T might be implemented within the constraints identified. I begin this paper
by giving a brief description of the evolution of the use of value-added taxation
around the world and continue by describing how V AT works. The focus in
section 3 is on four major structural issues which have to be considered when
This paper is based on a study commissioned by the Macro Group in Dar es Salaam, whose
members are drawn from the National Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance, Bureau of
Statistics and Bank of Tanzania. I would like to thank members of the Macro Group, in
particular, L.T. Msongole and RA. Shallanda, for their hospitality and support. I would also
like to thank Arild Angelsen, Ibrahim Lipumba, Hildegunn Nordås, Ussif Rasid Sumaila and
Inge Tvedten for many helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to the Norwegian
Agency for Development Support (NORAD) and the Research Council of Norway for financial
support. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 The "Commission of Enquiry into Public Revenues, Taxation and Expenditure" was appointed
in October 1989 to study and review the central and local tax systems and its administration,
and make recommendations (see URT, 1991a; and Fjeldstad, 1995b). Here I refer to this as the
Tax Commission or only the Commission.
3 Basu and Morrissey (1993), and personal communIcations with members of the Commission
and Governmental advisors.
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introducing a V AT, i.e., the rate structure, the tax base, the handling of services,
and legal and administrative features. Section 4 proceeds by discussing possible
complications in applying V AT in developing countries, emphasizing effects on
income distribution, administrative complexity, tax collection costs, as well as
possible inflationary effects. In section 5 I return to the question of V A T in
Tanzania, and discuss possible benefits as well as potential problems, including
institutional and administrative limitations. In section 6 the paper is summed up
and conclusions are drawn.
2 An ABC ofVAT
The value-added tax is, according to Goode (1984: 157), "the most important tax
innovation of the second half of the twentieth century". The speed with which the
value-added-tax system has spread around the world is unmatched by any other
tax in modern times. 30 years ago there was no comprehensive V AT anywhere
(Shoup, 1990). In Japan, immediately after the Second World War, a short-lived
V AT was implemented. In 1954 Franee introduced a limited V AT in the form of
a wholesale-level V AT to replace a multi-stage produetion tax (Metcalf, 1995:
127). A comprehensive value-added tax first appeared in Brazil in 1967. This tax
was designed to overcome the defects of turnover taxation and to secure a greater
degree of tax coordination among the states of the Brazilian Federation (Shoup,
1990: 4). Later in 1967 Denmark became the first country to introduce a
comprehensive V AT at the nationalleveL. In 1968 Franee merged the restricted
V AT with the existing turnover tax on services and a local tax on retaIl sales into
a single, comprehensive levy extending through the retaIl stage. In the following
years, the V AT was adopted by the other member states of the European
Community to replace their turnover taxes. Sweden, in 1969, and Norway, in
1970, enacted a V AT to replace a retaIl sales tax.4
Today, V AT is found in more than 90 countries. Of the OECD countries, only
Australia and the US do not use value-added taxes. All Latin American countries
now have V AT, as do several of the ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe
(e.g., Bulgaria, the Czech Republie, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and the
Slovak Republie ). A number of African and Asian countries have introduced or
plan to introduce V AT, including Côte d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mali,
Niger, Senegal and South Korea (IMF, 1992).
4 The two taxes are generally considered to be about the same, except that with a V A T there are
more taxpayers and a greater certainty of excluding producer goods.
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2.1 Features of the VAT
The reasons why so many countries have adopted the V AT are usually connected
with the following assumed features of the tax; neutrality, stabil it y and flexibility,
in addition to its revenue potentiai:5
- V A T is considered to be neutral with respect to foreign trade, and does not
distort domestie production and distribution.
- V A T is considered to be neutral regarding the produetion technique that a
business adopts. In other words, it makes no difference for the tax liabIlity
whether a product is manufactured with a capital- or labour-intensive
technology.
- V AT is considered not to be influenced by the forms or methods by which
business is conducted.
- V A T is considered to be a relatively stable source of government revenue.
Since consumption as a share of GDP fluctuates litte, by implication the V AT
is a stable source of revenue.
- V AT is a relatively flexible tax instrument; a change in the rate translates
immediately into more or less revenue. This is partly because the consumption
as a share of GDP in general fluctuates litte, and parly because the V AT is
collected on a current terms.
In addition to the points made above, consumption taxes are often considered as
an efficient means of taxation, since it is less likely to distort economic behaviour
than income taxes (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; and Kay, 1990). With high
marginal rates of income tax, individuals may have less incentive to work hard.
With a consumption tax, the extra income is not taxed until it is spent. Consump-
tion taxes can also be levied on a wide base. The wider the tax base, the lower
rate is needed to raise a given amount of revenue. In theory, people should be
taxed on everything they buy; in practice, many countries have numerous
exemptions from V AT while others tax some goods at lower rates.
A V AT taxes the value-added in production through the various stag es of
produetion. Value added is simply the differenee between the value of the goods
and services sold and the value of goods and services purchased as intermediate
inputs. Under a V AT, the sum of purehases (Le., the value added at earlier stages)
and value added by the firm itself equals (by definition) the value of the inputs
(which have a full tax credit attache d to them) of the next firm in the production-
distribution proeess. As a result, the same value-added is never taxed twice; that
is, cumulative effects do not occur. Moreover, at the final retail stage the sum of
all values added throughout the proeess and, by the same token, the sum of all the
differences between sales and pure has es equal the consumer price, excluding tax.
The final price, that is the price paid by consumers, has therefore to cover all the
5 Gilis et aL. (1990) provide a thorough discussion of V AT in developing countrIes.
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values added at the successive stages. V AT thus provides a systematie mechanism
for taxing final consumption whIle relieving transactions in intermediate goods. In
comparison, the retail sale tax is levied only at the time of sale to the consumer.
The total tax collected piecemeal under the V AT from all stages of produetion and
distribution is equal to a tax collected on the sale from retailer to the final
consumer or user, that is, a retailer-sales-tax. This equivalence has sometimes led
to a VAT being terme d a national sales tax (Metcalf, 1995:123).
2.2 Comparing V AT and sales tax
An increasing number of developing countries have converted their sales taxes to
value-added taxes (IMF, 1992, OECD, 1995). From an economic point of view,
there is, in principle, litte differenee between V AT and the retaIl sales tax (RST).
Levied at the same rates and covering the same number of goods and services,
both taxes should raise the same amount of revenues (see section 2.3). If V AT is
identical to a retaIl sales tax, why not collect the full tax at the retaIl stage through
a RST? WhIle the economic effects of the two taxes would be the same, the
design and administration of the taxes differ. A V AT is usually preferred for four
reasons:
- the potential coverage of the tax;
- its ability to distinguish producer goods from consumer goods;
- its ability to (effectively) correct border tax adjustments; and
- its administrative feasibility.
It is sometimes argued that the different ways in which a V AT and a retaIl sales
tax are collected may make enforcement of V AT more efficient.6 Under a retaIler
sales tax system, producers, wholesalers and retaIlers do not pay tax when they
buy or sell from one another. V AT in contrast, is paid throughout the production
chain. Registered intermediaries, but not the final consumer, reclaim V AT by
presenting a set of invoices to the tax authorities. This may make V AT harder to
avoid. While a good is being produeed, sellers have an interest in proving that
they have paid the tax on their inputs in order to reduce the tax liability on their
sales. With a retaIl sales tax system, in contrast, the burden of collecting the tax
lies entirely with the final seller of the good. Jf (s)he fails to charge it, the tax on
the whole value-added is lost. As the tax rises, the incentive to avoid it increases.
By limiting such incentives governments can set V AT at higher rates than they
could with retaIl sales tax. It is probably no coincidence that sales tax in the
United States are 8 percent, on average, compared with a total OECD average for
consumption taxes (including V AT) of nearer 20 percent (Economist, 1995). As
a rule of thumb, it is often reckoned that 10 percent is the highest level at which
a sales tax can be set without large-scale attempts at evasion.
6 This point is, however, questionable (see section 3.4 and 4.2).
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2.3 Alternative types of V AT7
There are three broad types of V AT:
1. The consumption V AT.
2. The income VAT.
3. The gross product V AT.
The gross domestie product (GDP) can be us ed as a starting point for ilustrating
the bases of the three V AT variants, and the relationship among them, since it
represents the total sum of the value added in the domestie produetion of goods
and services (Zee, 1995: 86). For ilustrative purposes, I consider a two-factor
(labour and capital), two-sector (private and public), open economy, where C is
private consumption, I is gross investment, Gc is public expenditure on goods and
services, Gw is public expenditure on wages and salaries, and (X-M) is the trade
balanee measured as the value of exported (X) less imported (M) goods and non-
factor services. Gross domestie product then equals:
GDP = C + I + Gc + Gw + (X-M)
Gross domestie income (GDI) is the sum of factor income payments (Le., wages
for labour; and interest, profits, etc., to capital) - often referred to as the value
added (V) - and depreciation (D):
GNI = V + D
The basic national accounting identity is given by:
GDP = GNI
This last equation can be stated in terms of either factor cost (Le., exclusive of
indirect taxes net of subsidies), or market prices (i.e., inclusive of indirect taxes
net of subsidies).
The gross product V AT (P- V AT) has the broadest base of the three V AT types.
It taxes all expenditures (except public sec tor wage expenditure, which is not taxed
under any variant of V AT), on GDP if implemented on the origin principle, and
on GDP adjusted for the trade balanee if implemented on the destination principle
(see section 2.4). Assuming that the origin principle is used, then the base of p-
V AT can be expressed as
P-VAT base = GDP - Gw = C + I + Gc + (X-M)
7 Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are based on Shoup (1990) and Zee (1995).
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The tax is computed by subtracting from a firm' s sales only purehases of goods
that are used up currently, not purehases of machinery or other capital goods. This
type of V AT is in restricted use, probably because it disallows deduction of both
purehases of capital goods and depreciation, and, thus, strongly discourages
investment by discriminating the use of capital goods.
The sec ond main form of V AT is the income type VAT (I-V AT). Gross investment
expenditure of the economy reflects the actual aggregate expenditure on capital
goods in a given period. However, par of this expenditure is us ed to compensate
for capital goods that have been consumed or depreciated. WhIle depreciation as
such is simply a bookkeeping entry and does not represent an actual economic
trans action, it does affect the computation of profitability, and therefore the value
added, of firms (Zee, 1995: 87). The aggregate tax base is equivalent to that for
a comprehensive income tax, excluding depreciation from its base:
i-V AT base = GDP - Gw - D = C + (I - D) + Gc + (X-M) = V - Gw
The last equality in this equation indicates that the base of an I-V AT is the sum
of factor income payments (net of government wage expenditure). Hence, it relies
on understanding the general cash flow for a firm. This type of V AT is used, for
example, by Argentina and Peru.
The consumption VAT (C-V AT) is the most common type. The tax is levied on
the total value of sales at each stage of produetion and allow a credit for any V AT
paid on inputs in production. Thus, in addition to depreciation, expenditures on
capital goods which contribute to a net augmentation of the capital stock are not
taxed. Thus, the entire gross investment expenditure is excluded from the tax base:
C-VAT base = GDP - Gw - I = C + Gc + (X-M)
The C- V AT is the most neutral of the three V A T types since it does not generate
distortion in the produetion proeess between capital and other inputs. It can be
considered a general tax on consumption (inc1usive of net exports if implemented
on the origin principle, as shown above). Providing the narrowest base of the three
V AT variants, C-VA T requires the highest rate to achieve a given revenue yield.
If the trade balanee (X-M) is removed from each of the three V AT bases, the
V AT variants would be converted to the destination principle (see section 2.4). In
this case, the C- V AT base becomes:
C-VAT base = C + Gc
This relation corresponds to the total sales tax at the retaIl level. Hence, a C- V AT
implemented under the destination principle is equivalent to a retail-sales tax (see
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section 2.2). However, the administration and collection mechanisms of the two
taxes are quite different.
2.4 Principles of implementing V AT
Each of the three variants of V AT discussed in section 2.3, can be implemented
under two principles - the origin and destination principles; and by using two main
methods of computation - the credit-invoice and subtraction methods (OECD,
1995; and Zee, 1995).
Under the origin principle the V AT is imposed on the value added of all taxable
products that are produced domestically. Under the destination principle the V AT
is imposed on the value added of all taxable products that are consumed
domestically (Zee, 1995: 88). The distinetion between the two principles is based
on the location of produetion and consumption, and not the type of products being
produced or consumed.8 The two principles are identical in a closed economy. In
an open economy, the differences between them lies in the treatment of exports
and imports. Under the origin principle, exports are taxed but imports are not,
whIle the converse is the case under the destination principle.
Most countries that have a V A T have implemented it on the destination principle.
This is due to two main reasons (Zee, 1995: 89): First, the destination principle
is regarded as effective in ensuring that traded products contain no V A Telements
of the exporting countries. The origin principle, in contrast, which allows imports
entering a country to bear the V AT burdens of exporting countries most likely wil
lead to undesirable tax competition, implicating that flexible prices and exchange
rates are not being viewed as adequate mechanisms for alleviating such behaviour
among trading countries. Second, although the destination principle requires border
tax adjustments, such adjustments can be carried out with relative ease. In any
case, they seem to be a small price for circumventing the potential valuation
problems associated with the origin principle.9
8 This distinction is analogous to that between the residence and source principles in income
taxation.
9 The restricted origin principle is an alternative for countries that are members of a customs or
economic union. If border controls on trades among union members are either absent or
ineffective by default, or their removal is a stated objective of the union, the implementation
of the destination principle is generally regarded as infeasible. Under the restricted origin
principle, V AT divergence among union members can be overcome by a c1earinghouse
mechanism whereby the importer in a member country is given credit (under the credit-invoice
method) for the V AT paid on his/her imports in the exporting member countries. Such foreign
credits would be recorded byevery union member against every other union member, and the
net claims on each member would be settled by a clearinghouse (Zee, 1995: 90).
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Two alternative methods are used for computing the value added of a taxable
transaction under a V AT; the credit or invoice method, and the subtraction
method.lO
The credit method requires that the amount of V AT charged is explicitly stated on
the invoice associated with any taxable transaction. For purposes of claiming the
credit, a firm is required to show proof, usually an invoice, that the V AT has been
paid by its supplier. This provides a form of self-regulation in V AT enforeement,
since firms have an incentive to ensure that the V ATthat their supplier c1aims to
have paid has in fact been paid. The amount of tax a firm (or merchant) submits
to the tax authorities is simply the difference between the tax collected on its sales
and the tax it paid on its purehases. Since it is the consumer who bears the
ultmate burden of the V AT, the merchant at each stage, in principle, acts as a tax
collection agent.
Under the subtraction method, each firm's (or merchants) tax liability is
computed by applying the applicable V AT rate to the difference between its total
sales (inclusive of the V AT element in its sales price) and its total purehases
(inc1usive of the V AT element in the purehase price). Hence, unlike the credit
method, the amount of V AT connected with a taxable trans action is not required
to be explicitly stated on the associated invoice.
Jf the V A T has a single rate and no exemptions and zero-ratings, the subtraction
method yields the same outcome as the credit method. When the V A T contains
multiple rates and extensive exemptions neither method is capable of completely
overcoming the undesirable effects of these imperfections in the V A T system
itself. In this case, the choice between them comes down to a comparison of costs
and benefits in each.
With the credit method, the important negative implication is that exempting any
firm (or merchant) situated anywhere before the final stage along the production-
distribution chain breaks the credit chain and results in cascading, which reduces
one of the fundamental benefits of having a V AT in the first place. With the
subtraction method, no such cascading can result. It is, however, incapable of
handling multiple rates. The preferred method therefore depends on the nature and
severity of the imperfections of the V A T system. The general use of multiple rates
is probably the most important reason for the prevalenee of the credit method in
the V AT systems around the world (Zee, 1995: 96).11
10 A third method, known as the addition method, defines value added on the basis of the sum of
factor payments, including profits. This method is rarely used.
11 This limitation of the subtraction method could be removed byensuring that the adoption of
a V AT would only entail a single-rate, such as in Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Indonesia, Japan,
Madagascar,New Zealand and Pakistan (see Table 3.1).
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3 Structural issues of V A T
Before introducing a V AT, four major structural issues should be addressed
(Cnossen, 1992:229):
1. The rate structure: if a uniform rate is not acceptable because of distributional
reasons, how should rate differentiation be effected?
2. The base.' should the V AT extend through the retail stage, and how should
small traders, farmers, and public sector bodies be treated?
3. Treatment of services: which services should be exempted?
4. Legal and administrative features: how to audit and punish defectors?
3.1 The rate structure
From a theoretical point of view there is no presumption that a single V A T rate
wil minimize economic distortions.12 Multiple rates may, however, offer a
greater opportunity to fit the V AT to various social and political ends (Gilis,
1990: 12). But having several rates adds (often significantly) to administrative and
compliance costs, and may also create additional problems with similar goods
bein g taxed at different rates (OECD, 1995: 15). Most countries with V AT
therefore try to keep the number of tax rates to a minimum (see Table 3.1).
Countries which have most recently introduced V AT, for instanee Japan and New
Zealand, have chosen one or at most two V AT rates.
In many countries the V A Tapplies either a zero rate or reduced rates to
necessities, a standard rate to the majority of sectors, and a higher rate to luxury
items and goods whose consumption the government wants to discourage (Mitra,
1992: 205). Recently, the possibIlity of V AT differentiation for environmental
purposes has been raised (OECD, 1995: 20). The intention is to influence
consumer demand for goods which represents negative or positive environmental
effects in production, by using high and low V AT rates, respectively. Lower V AT
rates on labour intensive servIces have also been suggested as a means to promote
employment. Under the credit method this differentiation of rates by commodity
can be achieved only at the retaIl level. It is the final sale to the consumer that
must be given the lower or higher rate. Jf commodity-differing rates are imposed
only at earlier stages, the credit mechanism by the uniform retail rate wil wipe out
the effects of the differentiation. In contrast, under the subtraction method
commodity differentiation can be made effective at any stage without being
cancelled at a later stage (Shoup, 1990: 12). Administrative feasibIlity is, however,
often the principal obstac1e to using different rates for policy purposes.
12 According to the Ramsey pricing rule, the optimal tax structure which minimizes distortions is
one where tax rates on goods are inversely related to the elasticity of demand for that good (see
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
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The distinetion between exemption and zero-mting requires a brief explanation.
Exempted sectors, because they are not part of a V AT, do not pay taxes on their
output. The exemption releases one from the responsibilty for collecting the V AT
or filing any paperwork on sales and purehases. By the same token, one cannot
claim credit for taxes paid on one's inputs. Hence exempted sectors are taxed on
their inputs rather than on their outputs, whereas sectors under the V AT are taxed
on their outputs rather than their inputs. Zero-rated sectors, by contrast, are
exempted from taxation on both their inputs and their outputs. Zero-rating
therefore offers a precise way of according relief from taxation.
Experience suggests that a V A T imposed at low rates may not be worth the
administrative and compliance costs involved in the switch to the V AT. The start-
up costs may be quite high in the first two or three years of application. In
particular, the additional investment in tax administration that would be required
before and during the first years of operation of the tax may be high. No rule of
thumb exists, but Gilis et aL. (1990: 221) argue that it is doubtful that an initial
base rate below 7 percent would be worthwhile for developing countries planning
to introduce comprehensive VATs.
Table 3.1 shows the main rates of V A T and additional rates applying to a subset
of goods in some selected countries. The rates shown are those that apply to
domestie sales; virtually all of the countries zero-rate exports. Kenya has the
largest number of different rates - six; followed by Belgium and Morocco with
five rates (inc1uding zero rating). Two or three rates are more common. Of the
countries listed in the table several have additional taxes on particular
commodities. These are separate from the V AT and are therefore not subject to
refund. In the European Community, for instance, these additional taxes are excise
taxes on tobacco, a1cohol, gasoline, and diesel oiL.
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Table 3.1: V AT rates in selected countries
Belgium (1995) 20.5 0/1/6/12
ChIle (1991) 18 None
Côte d'Ivoire (1991) 25 11.11/35.13
Denmark (1995) 25 None
Ecuador (1991) 6 None
Franee (1995) 18.6 2.1/5.5
Germany (1995) 15 7
Haiti (1991) 10 None
Indonesia (1991) 10 None
Italy (1995) 19 4/9/13
Japan (1995) 5 None
Kenya (1991) 17 20/40/50/270
Madagascar (1991) 15 None
Malawi (1991) 35 10/55/85
Mali (1991) 17 10
Mexico (1995) 10 0/6
Morocco (1991) 19 7/12/14/30
Netherlands (1995) 17.5 6
New Zealand (1995) 12.5 None
Norway (1995) 22 O
Pakstan (1991) 12.5 None
Senegal (1991) 20 7/34/50
South Korea (1991) 10 2/3.5
Sweden (1995) 25 12/21
Taiwan (1991) 5 15/25
Tanzania (proposal) 20-30 0/.::0/10
Tunisia (1991) 17 6/29
Turkey (1995) 15 1/8/23
United Kingdom (1995) 17.5 0/8
Sources: Tait (1988); URT (1991a); Mitra (1992); and OECD (1995)
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3.2 The base
Most countries with value-added taxes treat small traders differently - either
excluding them from the scope of the tax or subjecting them to some kind of
"simplified" system. Generally, there are two reasons given for providing special
treatment for small firms:
- It may co st more to administer the taxing of small firms than the revenue
produeed.
- Tax evas ion is most prevalent in this sector.
The relatively high compliance costs of V AT to small businesses argue in favour
for special treatment. During the transition to a market economy, the number of
small businesses in a formerly planned economy, in general, increase
dramatically.13 Initially, artisans and the small business sector, stil in its infancy,
can hardly be expected to keep adequate records of their transactions for V AT
purposes. Small traders and artisans face relatively higher costs complying with
the obligations imposed on them under V AT than do other taxpayers. At the same
time, the tax administration wil be fully occupied with collecting the new tax
from large and medium-sized businesses, which have to introduce new accounting
systems and are generally not used to complying voluntarily with taxes such as the
V AT. The tax administration would therefore incur relatively higher costs in
enforeing the V A T on the small business sector.
Most OECD countries with a V AT exclude small-scale traders and producers with
an annual turn over below a specified amount, referred to as the registration
threshold, from the obligation to register, furnish returns and pay tax, or keep
prescribed records (OECD, 1995). Of course, exempting small firms do es not
mean that they do not bear V AT. Since the V AT is included in the cost of the
goods and services it will presumably be passed forward to purchasers. It means
that the value-added of such firms is not taxed.
As small businesses prosper the tax authority would presumably be in a better
position to deal with them. Simplified schemes for specified small businesses,
which would provide for the presumptive computation of the tax liability , may
then be introduced. Such taxpayers may be obliged to furnish returns less of ten
than regular taxpayers, to maintain simplified records, and to keep their accounts
on a payments, rather than an accrual basis. Although it would not be advisable
to spend excessive administrative resources on presumptive assessment schemes,
some arrangement may be necessary, particularly if small firms would not be
subject to the income tax.14
13 This is also the case in Tanzania (URT, 1991b; and Bagachwa and Naho, 1995).
14 Fjeldstad (1995b: 31) discusses this in relation to Tanzania.
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Options avaIlable to policymakers for dealing with small business firms include
exempting them from or establishing special tax regimes for them (OECD, 1995).
Due (1990:68) notes that while exemption is the administratively expedient option,
it may not be in the interest of the enterprises. By breaking the chain of tax credits
available through the V AT exemption one may overtax firms which cannot credit
the cost against their taxes. This fact reduces the gain from exempting small firms,
and may provide an incentive for small firms to register for the tax.
The V ATtreatment of farmers and other primary producers engaged in agriculture,
animal husbandry, horticulture, forestry, fishing, etc., requires special attention in
developing countries because of their importanee to the economy and the essential
nature of their products. If taxed, farmers would have to comply with the usual
V A T obligations. If exempted, however, they would not incur compliance costs,
but they would stil have to pay the element of V AT on their inputs of feed, seed,
fertilizer, equipment, and machinery for which a deduction cannot be provided.
Because farmers are situated at the beginning of the production-distribution
proeess, this element of tax would cascade throughout the proeess.
In the OECD countries, farmers are either taxed or exempted (Due, 1990;
Cnossen, 1992). New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom treat farmers in
the same manner as any otherproducers of taxable products; that is, they have to
comply with the same requirements for furnishing returns and making payments.
Other OECD countries do not require farmers to register and compensate them for
the tax borne on their purehases of V AT-liable inputs. Inclusion of small farmers
in the V AT system in developing countries would most likely pose serious
problems for taxpayers compliance, due to low levels of literacy, accounting skills
etc. Small farmers may also withdraw from the market and into subsistence
farming when taxed or controlled by the state in other ways.15 But probably more
serious is the severe limitations on administrative resources, and lack of legal and
economic sophistication, which at present makes it unrealistic to inc1ude small
farmers in the V A T net. Due (1990: 68) suggests that one alternative may be to
exempt small farmers from the registration requirement while zero-rating major
farm-inputs, such as seed, fertilizer, pesticides, livestock, etc., and place a V AT
on minor farm inputs.
3.3 Treatment of services
Service sectors constitute an important and increasing share of economic activity
in all countries, ranging from about one-third of GDP in low income countries to
two-thirds or more in high income industrial countries. On this background,
inclusion of services within the base of a comprehensive V AT is advisable to
15 This problem, related to the taxation of peasants in Tanzania, was first addressed by Hyden
(1980).
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increase revenue or to allow lower rates of tax on commodities (see Table 3.2).
Both consumer services, e.g., restaurants, hotels and theatres, and business services
(exc1uding financial services) can be inc1uded in the V AT base.
Some concessions must, however, be made for social policy considerations or on
administrative grounds. It would, for instance, be difficult to defend and, in the
absenee of a charge, to administer the taxation of health, education, social and
religious services. These public services are exempted in the OECD countries. A
second group of activities often exempted inc1udes (i) financial services, e.g.,
dealings in money, shares, bonds, lending money, operating bank accounts and
advancing credit, (ii) insurance and (iii) gambling. These are usually exempted
because of the difficulty of isolating and measuring the service element (Gilis,
1990). Exemption rather than zero-rating are chosen, principally for revenue
reasons. Zero-fating would ensure equal taxation of closely-competing businesses
in away that exemption does not. Exemption, however, means that some tax is
embodied in the price of the services sold to businesses (see section 3.1).
Housing services are also often exc1uded from the V AT base. These services
could, however, be taxed by using separate levies outside the structure of the V AT
(Conrad, 1990). Many countries do impose V AT on the sales of newly constructed
bUIldings. This implies that owners of existing residential structures get all the
benefit of any increase in the value of the building, following the imposition of
V AT (OECD, 1995).
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Table 3.2: V A T revenue and base in selected countries (1988)
Belgium 7.2 G+S
ChIle 8.8 G+S
Côte d'Ivoire NA G+ST
Denmark 9.5 G+S
Ecuador 2.5 G+ST
Franee 11.9 G+S
Germany 3.8 G+S
Haiti 1.8 G + S+ CG
Indonesia 4.5 G+ST
Italy 5.8 G+S
Madagascar 1.5 G+S
Mauritius 2.1 G
Mexico 3.4 G+S
Morocco NA G+S
Netherlands 8.0 G+S
New Zealand 6.7 G+S
Niger NA G+S
Norway 9.4 G+ST
South Korea 3.3 G+S
Sweden 7.5 G+S
Taiwan 2.6 G+S
Togo NA G+S
Tunisia 2.8 G+S
Turkey 1.7 G+S
United Kingdom 6.0 G+S
Source: Bogetie and Hassan (1993)
Codes: G = consumer goods only; G + S = consumer goods and services;
G + S + CG = consumer goods, services and capital goods;
G + ST = consumer ,goods and selected services.
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J3.4 Legal and administrative features
Although a V AT may not be as complicated as some observers se em to believe,
the unfamiliarity with an accounts-based levy and the need for intensive taxpayer
education most likely require an extension of the usual lead-in time in low income
developing countries, inc1uding Tanzania. Experience suggests that it requires 18
to 24 months to make a V AT fully operational (Cnossen, 1992: 242).
The preparation and introduction of a V AT involves, in general, five major tasks
(which are partially overlapping):
- Resolve major stfUctural policy issues and secure parliamentary approval of the
V AT law.
- Design administrative systems and procedures (inc1uding computers).
- Prepare staff instructions (manuals).
- Train staff.
- Provide taxpayer advisory services.
Experience indicates that it is useful to draw up a detaIled timetable for the
various steps to be taken from the day of the V AT' s inception to the first day of
implementation.16 Sound preparatory work minimizes the number of flaws that
show up later - when they are much more difficult and costly to correct.
The tax credit type of V AT (see section 2.4) does have three anti-evasion features
not present in a retail sales tax. First, its self-policing attributes; second, its
possibilities of cross-checking of invoices; and third, its tendency to collect a
major portion of revenues before the retaIl stage. The administrative benefit of the
self-policing feature arises from the fact that underpayment of the V AT by a firm
selling to another firm increases the V AT liability of the buyer. This advantage is
probably only significant as long as evasion at the point of final sale is not
endemic (see section 4.2). The advantages offered by cross-checks under the V AT
also depend much on the firms' perception of the tax administration's capacity
(and intention) to perform cross-checking operations (Sandford and Godwin,
1990).
A successful V AT depends on effective auditing, which should be selective and
comprehensive. Proper guidelines for auditing are essential, e.g., an audit selection
programme, based on, among other criteria, gross profit margins and type of
economic activity. Finally, swift and automatie (administrative) penalties are
essential, differentiated by type of transgression: failure to register, to file areturn,
or to pay the tax.
16 For example, the Tanzanian Tax Commission (URT, 1991a) presents an implementation
programme in its report (see section 5.3).
16
Penalties for late payment of V AT in the OECD countries, for instance, consist of
payments either of a single fine, invariably expressed as percentage of the overdue
tax, or a cumulative monthly fine based on the total amount outstanding, or both.
These penalties var significantly from country to country (OECD, 1995: 49). In
general, fixed fee penalties provide a strong incentive to pay promptly, but for an
extended period of non-payment, the cumulative nature of the monthly penalties
quickly amounts to a large sum.
In many countries the same tax inspectors control V AT, income tax and the main
capital taxes paid by a taxpayer. Separate tax returns may be furnished by the
taxpayer, but any control or audit covers all of the taxes for which the department
is responsible. The different tax returns can be systematically checked against one
another for consistency and credibIlity. In other countries taxes are administered
by separate tax departments (which is the case in Tanzania, at present).17 Usually
access to the tax returns handled by another department are strictly controlled. Tax
controls and audits generally focus on the tax for which that particular department
is responsible. In this case, procedures enabling the flow of information from one
department to another may be developed. Joint audits may involve groups of tax
inspectors who specialize in different taxes.
4 Complications in applying a VA T
Despite the growing popularity of value-added taxes in developing countries it is
important not to overemphasize the role of this tax. The recent trend reflects to
some degree a change more in form than in substance, with most revenue most
likely continuing to come from taxes on international transactions (particularly on
consumer goods imports), and the typical excIse and sales tax base ofthe so-called
"demerit goods", i.e., beer, tobacco, spirits, etc. (see, e.g., Fjeldstad, 1995b).
Critics of the V AT usually focus on (i) income distribution, (ii) administrative
complexity and tax collection costs, and (iii) inflationary effects:18
4.1 Income distribution
The most common criticism is that the burden of V A T is distributed regressively
with respect to income. Since consumption as a share of income falls as income
rises, a V A T levied at a uniform rate falls more heavIly on the poor than on the
rich (see, e.g., McLure, 1990). This is because it is nearly impossible to
17 Recently, the Tanzanian Government has established a new tax authority; Tanzania Revenue
Authority (the Act was signed on August 8 1995). The two existing tax departments, the
Department of Income Tax and the Customs and Sales Tax Department, wil, after a
transitionary period, be shut down, and their responsibilties transferred to the new authority.
18 See, e.g., Cnossen (1992).
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distinguish, for instance, expensive higher-quality food products bought by the rich
from less expensive ordinary food products bought by the poor. Jf such a
distinetion is not feasible, lower rates become less effective in reducing the
regressivity of the VAT.19
Jf no tax relief is granted to the poor under a V AT, the burde n on them might be
offset by using the extra V AT revenue that derives from taxing necessities
consumed by the poor to supply them with additional transfer payments in cash
or free government services. Instead of distorting the tax system through
diversified tax rates, cash may be a more efficient way of reaching the poor (see,
e.g., Metcalf, 1995: 134). This solution, however, underestimates the greater
administrative difficulties in developing countries, compared with high income-
countries, of using transfer payments to alleviate poverty.
For distributional reasons many developed countries hesitate to apply a single
value added tax rate across the board (Sandford et aL., 1990: 214). A developing
country that lacks a sophisticated social security system to compensate the poor
for the higher prices of necessities due to V AT, has much more reason to be
cautious in this respect. Attention should therefore be devoted to techniques of
removing from the tax base certain consumption goods, notably foodstuffs, that
play a larger ro le in the budgets of the poor than in those of the richer income
groups. This may also be a more co st efficient alternative than cash transfers. In
a developing country the question of introducing more than one rate of V A T
should be determined by the extent of commtment to certain social and economic
policies. The major constraint, however, is probably to fit the tax to the limited
administrative capacity of the country in question.
4.2 Administrative complexity and tax collection costs
Strong arguments have been advanced against the use of multi pl e rates under a
V AT. To begin with, rate graduation is a very blunt and expensive instrument for
mitigating regressivity. There seems to be general recognition that deparures from
uniform rates of V AT do giv e rise to complications and costs for the tax
administration and taxpayers alike (Gills et aL., 1990:224). Widespread iliteracy
and innumeracy characterizing many developing countries make record-keeping
burdensome, particular for small businesses and farmers. Payments of refunds
may therefore create particular difficulties. Further, the capacity of a V AT to resist
tax evasion in par relies on sophisticated cross-checking, on computerization, and
19 Recent tax incidence research argues that a broad-based consumption tax (e.g., a V AT) is
proportional over the consumer's lifetime (see, e.g., Metcalf, 1994). In the absence of legacies,
lifetime income wil equal the present discounted stream of consumption. From this view, a
proportional broad-based consumption tax would exact the same fraction of lifetime income
from everyone, and the tax appears proportional rather than regressive.
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on a staff of well-trained and motivated staff. These resources are, in general,
inadequate in developing countries, and evasion is often more prevalent (Fjeldstad,
1995a and 1995b). V AT may also provide an opportunity for fraud through fictive
c1aims for excessive credits and rebates, particularly through the use of counterfeit
invoices. This opportunity is not avaIlable in other forms of sales tax (Sandford
and Godwin, 1990; and Kay and Davis, 1990). The V AT introduced in Guatemala
in 1983, for exarple, failed to match the changed tax structure with an
appropriately changed tax administration, and had disastrous effects on revenue
collection (Bird, 1992: 121).
The costs of administrating a V AT are inevitably increased by a differentiated rate
structure, because it may lead to problems of delineating products and interpreting
the rules regarding which rate should be applied (see section 3.1). Experience in
both developing and developed countries indicates that a V AT imposed at low
rates may not be worth the administrative and compliance costs involved in the
switch to the V AT. According to Sandford and Godwin (1990: 214), "there is
much in the conventional wisdom that, on balance, a retail sales tax is preferable
if the rate is low but that the value added tax has the advantage if the rate is to
be high".
Based on a sample survey in the United Kingdom, Sandford and Godwin (1990)
found that the compliance costs of the taxpayer, expressed as a percentage of the
tax itself, were considerably higher than the administrative costs of the government
in collecting the tax. Differentiated rates involve a significant increase in
compliance costs, particularly of small firms. Usually, it is not possible for small
firms to keep separate accounts for the sales of differentially taxed products. The
tax liabIlity must then be determined by applying presumptive methods, an
approach that increases the difficulty of monitoring the taxpayer' s compliance.
There is also evidence that the increase in compliance costs attributable to
differentiated rates is distributed regressively with respect to income (Cnossen,
1992). Smaller firms with lower incomes bear proportionally more of the burden
than do larger firms.
4.3 Inflationary effects
An often-voiced concern in countries without a V A T is that the introduction of the
tax would set in motion a spiral in which the tax, prices and wages would feed on
each other, that is, a V AT would be inflationary. This vie w often confuses a one-
time price increase with a continual increase in prices. In an extensive study about
the potential impact on prices of introducing a V A T or changing its rate structure,
Tait (1990) found that in 22 out of 35 cases evaluated, the introduction of the
V A T had little or no effect on the consumer price index. In 8 cases the
introduction of a V AT was associated with a once-and-for-all upward shift in the
consumer price index. In only one of these cases could this shift be said to
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contribute to an acceleration in the rate of increase of the consumer price index.20
Whether prices rise or not depends on whether the tax is passed forward or passed
back in the form of lower factor payments. What happens wil depend on the
response of the Central Bank. An accommodating monetary policy would allow
consumer prices to increase by the same of the tax whIle a tight policy would
force factor payments to fall (Metcalf, 1995: 130). Price controls have also been
used effectively to dampen the potential price-wage acceleration of inflation after
the V A T introduction in, for instance, Austria, France, South Korea, the
Netherlands and Norway (Tait, 1990).
5 Value-added tax in Tanzania
The replacement of the present sales tax by a value-added tax is the Tanzanian
Tax Commission's central recommendation in the area of indirect taxation. It
seems clear that the Commission envisages the V AT, and its potential future
extensions to a wider tax base, as a major component of Tanzania' s future revenue
system (see section 1). The Commission states that it "considers that the smooth
introduction of a V AT is so important that it has not recommended any major
changes in the current structure and rates of Sales Tax which would merely disrupt
the vital work for the transition and operate for only a limited period" (URT,
1991a: executive summary para. 25). Initially the coverage of V AT was
recommended to be as for sales tax as currently applied, namely at the level of
mallufacturers and at the importer level. The proposed V A T should also be applied
to services which are currently sales taxable and a few other services. Over time,
V AT should be extended to the wholesale and, subsequently, to the retaIl leveL.
In this section I describe and discuss some important features and principles of the
proposed V A T system.
5.1 Principles of a VAT in Tanzania
The present Tanzanian sales tax is applied on the sus pens ion principle, whereby
producers of taxable goods are permitted to buy taxable inputs free from tax. The
sales tax is imposed when the sale of goods by manufacturers takes place or on
importation of similar goods. Manufacturing in this context is de fine d as "a
proeess which changes substance, character (for example through assembly), or
appearance (e.g. dyeing) of the goods" (URT, 1991a: para. 12.1). The suspension
system operates through the use of Registered Dealer Certificates, whereby
registered dealers can buy taxable raw materials and other taxable inputs free of
tax. Exporters and duty free shops are entitled to simIlar treatment under Export
20 See also Zee (1995: 90) for a discussion of price effects of a V AT.
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Certificates which enable them to buy goods for exports and for duty free sales
free of tax.
The potential benefits of replacing the existing sales tax by a V A T were expected
to be fivefold:
(i) The flexibilty of setting the V AT-rates was expected to give scope for
generating increased revenue (URT, 1991a: para. 12.8). The increased
revenue productivity required the V AT base to be broad, covering as many
goods and services aspossible.
(ii) The invoice-credit method of V AT (see section 2.4) was expected to
minimize unintended distortions by avoiding the tax cascading of the existing
sales tax system (URT, 1991a: para. 12.9).
(iii) By applying the destination principle (see section 2.4) the V AT should
ensure that commodities were taxed in the country where they were
consumed (not in the country where they were produeed) as required under
the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This
was assumed to be achieved by (a) levying the same tax on imported goods
and on goods domestically produeed; and (b) freeing exports from tax (URT,
1991a: para. 12.10).
(iv) Simplicity was expected to be to achieved by limiting the number of V AT
rates as well as the number of exemptions (URT, 1991a: para. 12.11).
(v) It was anticipated that once the traders became used to fillng in the V AT-
forms, evasion would decline due to the self-policing nature of V AT (URT,
1991a: para. 12.12; and 12.13). In this respect, it was also expected that
V A T would encourage traders and manufacturers to keep proper records, and
encourage purehasing and recording inputs on which tax had been paid
(URT, 1991 a: para. 12.41). As the practice of keeping proper records spread,
one expected that the tax base for V AT would grow to a wider coverage
than sales tax and revenue would increase (URT, 1991a: para. 12.23; 12.24;
12.41; 12.42; and 23.8).
Further, V AT was favoured because it was assumed that it had a relatively high
tax elasticity and buoyancy compared to sales tax (see Osoro, 1992). The
Commission is, however, rather vague as to the revenue implications of its V AT
proposal (URT, 1991a: para. 24.20), apparently because of uncertainty both as to
the final rate structure and the extent to which exemptions would be eliminated.
5.2 The V AT base and rates
The Tax Commission argues convincingly that the introduction of a full-fledged
V AT in Tanzania would be difficult (URT, 1991a: para. 12.15). This proeess is
inhibited by weaknesses in tax administration, the limited scope of the present tax
system (see Fjeldstad, 1995b), and the relatively low level of economic
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sophistication, particularly in the business sector. For instance, the retail sector in
Tanzania is comprised mostly of small outlets without adequate records; a
situation which would precipitate problems of compliance and control. SimIlarly,
limiting the V AT' s application to cover only wholesales would also be problematie
since wholesale activity is not a c1early defined category. Wholesale is of ten
conducted by firms which are also manufacturers, and may also include retaIl
businesses (URT, 1991a: para. 12.18).
On this background, the Commission recommended that V AT should initially be
confined to the import and manufacturing levels. However, over time, the
Commission argued, that the V AT should be extended to the wholesale, and
subsequently, to the retail level (URT, 1991a: para. 12.19).
The V AT base wil, according to the Tax Commssion, be significantly broadened
vis-a-vis the present sales tax system (URT, 1991a: para. 12.23). First, the
domestie manufacturers who are currently exc1uded from sales tax, and, hence,
unregistered as sales taxpayers wil be registered as taxpayers under a V AT
system. Second, a number of items not liable to sales tax wil be subjected to
V AT. Third, the number of goods excluded from tax would be limited. For
example, the Commission recommended that the existing "discretionary"
exemptions from sales and excise taxes - like those on customs duties - shall be
abolished (URT, 1991a: para. 12.24). At the same time, the Commission
recommended many of the existing excise taxes, notably on textiles, to be
eliminated (URT, 1991:para. 13.15). This has now be en done for locally produced
textiles - with the remaining excises being levied at rates ranging from 10 to 85
percent (Fjeldstad, 1995b). Fourth, V AT wil be extended to include services such
as electricity, telephone, private mail courier services, and designated hotels and
restaurants. For social and administrative reasons, certain services were
recommended to be exc1uded from V AT, e.g., safari tours, domestie and
international air transport, road and rail transport, professional services (other than
health services), hair dressing, motor vehic1e maintenance and repair, etc. (URT,
1991a: para 19.24a). The Commission further recommended that there shall be no
exemption for small firms (URT, 1991a: para. 12.26).
A V AT with four rates was recommended (URT, 1991a: para. 12.34):21
- Zero rate for basic goods such as farm inputs (e.g., fertilizers, seeds,
agricultural machinery and tools), unprocessed food, live animals, nursery
stoeks, industrial machinery and exported goods (URT, 1991a: para. 12.24b).
21 The Commission states that it "recommend two positive rates in addition to the zero rate"
(URT, 1991a: para. 12.34). However, since the CommIssion argues in favour of a V AT rate
applied to services not above 10 percent, I consider this as a rate different from the proposed
10 percent rate on utilties and essential goods.
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- A low rate, not above 10 percent, for services such as international telephone
calls, electricity and transport (URT, 1991a: para. 12.36).
- A rate of 10 percent on utilities and some essential items, e.g., baby foods and
dietetic products (URT, 1991a: para. 12.35).
- A standard rate between 20 and 30 percent.
5.3 V AT administration
To administer the V A T the Tax Commssion recommended creating a new Sales
Tax Department (URT, 1991a: para. 21.6). Although it is important for the
successful operation of the V AT that the organization, and probably some of the
personneI, not simply replicate the existing sales tax part of the Customs and Sales
Tax Department (CSTD), one should be cautious in establishing new
administrative units. Tax reforms may, however, provide an opportunity to
introduce improvements to strengthening tax enforcement and improving the
existing tax administration.22 Most of what the Tax Commssion's Report has to
say in this respect is very reasonable. For example:
- More use can be made of information already available to the tax departments
(URT, 1991a: para. 23.6).
- There should be more exchanges of information between these departments and
other government ageneies (URT, 1991a: para. 23.6).
- There should be more careful supervision of third-party withholders (URT,
1991a: para. 6.55).
- There should be established a system ofunique taxpayer numbers (URT, 1991a:
para. 6.100).
- There should be established a meaningful system of field audits (URT, 1991a:
para. 11.47).
Although several potential problems were recognised by the Tax Commssion,
these were not considered as critical impediments for introducing a value-added
tax. However, the following factors (also mentioned by the Commssion) need
serious consideration before introducing the V AT. First, even a simple V AT,
where only manufacturers are the liable tax units, wil be a more complex version
of the sales tax but applying also to inputs. Second, a V AT wil probably impose
much higher collection and compliance costs than the existing system, largely
because of the detaIled recording and monitoring required. Third, and related to
the first two, the present Tanzanian tax administration is probably not able to
introduce a V AT system smoothly and efficiently. As the existing system of
keeping records is limited any V AT system wil be difficult and costly, in both
time and training, to introduce, Finally, the complexity of records required can
22 The Government seems to have seized thIs opportunity by establishing Tanzania Revenue
Authority (see note 17).
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encourage evasion. Fraud may also be encouraged through fictive claims for
excessive credits and rebates (see section 4.2). On this background, further
consideration is needed on a number of aspects of the V AT -excise package,
including:
- A gradual incorporation of the small business sector into the V AT net, may
take several years. In the current situation, it is not advisable, contrary to the
Tax Commssion' s recommendation, to include this sector in a V AT system
(see section 3.2).
- Close attention should be paid to the transitional problems that have bedevIled
V AT adoption in other developing countries (see Gilis et aL., 1990). It may
also be wise to investigate carefully the experiences of Malawi and Kenya,
which adopted V A T in 1989 and 1990, respectively.
- Simplicity should be emphasized, in particular by limiting the number of V A T
rates to a maximum of two (see section 5.2).
- Care should be taken to avoid increasing regressivity of the tax system (e.g.,
by exempting not only unprocessed food but also a limited number of other
basic food items).
- Jf V A T is implemented, one should con sider to include excise duties in the
V A T base. Further, excise rates should be adjusted to maintain the desired
effective tax rate. WhIle it may be desirable to retain specific rates for certain
high-rate excises, one should consider the possibIlity of making explicit
provision for periodic adjustments to retain the real value of such taxes.
Experience throughout the world suggests that to design and implement a value-
added-tax, starting from Tanzania' spresent situation, is likely to take about two
years (Cnossen, 1992: 242). The Government of Tanzania announced in its 1992
Budget its intention to replace the existing sales tax with a V AT in Januar
1994.23 To this date, however, little progress has been made in this area. Several
years wil therefore pass before much revenue can be counted on from this source.
6 Conclusion: Should Tanzania introduce VA T?
There is no a priori reason for proclaiming that the value-added tax is better or
worse than a retail sales tax. Conventional wisdom indicates that a V A T is
preferable if the rate is high but that the sales tax is preferable if the rate is to be
low (Sandford and Godwin, 1990:214). The unique features of the V AT, Le., the
multistage collection and the rebate system, may, despite increasing administrative
and compliance costs compared to asales tax, provide a more accurate and
reliable mechanism for excluding tax from business costs and export prices. A
23 The Tax Commission recommended the V A T to be introduced at the beginning of fiscal year
1993/94, i.e., July 1993 (URT, 1991a: para. 12.44). In its report, the Commission also presents
a V AT implementation programme, covering twenty four months.
24
V AT structure with minimum exemptions and one or two rates wil minimize the
administrative and compliance costs and maximize the advantages claimed for
value added taxation. However, multiple V A T rates are often chosen for
distributional purposes in developed countries. A developing country, that lacks
a sophisticated social security system to compensate the poor for the higher prices
of necessities due to the V AT, has reason to be cautious in this respect.
The disadvantages of the V AT structure seem to be accentuated in low income
countries (see section 4), and its potential advantages are less likely to be realized
(see section 2). For instance, many of the administrative and compliance problems
of V AT observed in OECD countries are more significant in developing countries,
where the small business and farming sectors constitute a larger part of the
economy. Sandford and Godwin (1990) report that small businesses in the United
Kingdom have difficulties with record-keeping for V AT. In countries where
literacy and numeracy are much less widespread, record-keeping is even more
burdensome. Payments of refunds create particular difficulties in many countries.
Further, the capacity of V AT to resist evasion rests in part on relatively
sophisticated cross-checking and on a corps of well-trained and adequately paid
tax officers. These resources are inadequate (or absent) in many developing
countries, and evasion is consequently more prevalent. V AT also provides
opportunities for fraud not available in other forms of sales tax; i.e. fictive c1aims
for excessive credits and rebates, paricularly through use of counterfeit invoices.
In addition, the more exemptions there are, the less complete and precise the
exclusion of tax from export prices.
Should Tanzania introduce a value-added tax? The administrative limitations are
at present most evident in respect of V AT in Tanzania. Before implementing a
V AT, both tax collectors and payers require training, preparation and manuals. Its
introduction,given the situation as of late 1995, would probably be disastrous.
There is a widespread unpreparedness, no or inadequate records, and the increased
compliance costs incurred by taxpayers wil most likely encourage evasion (see
section 4.2 and 5.3). The merit of the existing sales tax lies in its simplicity, at
least relative to V AT.
This does not mean that the V AT does not have important merits for a low income
country such as Tanzania. However, expectations must be set lower, and the tax
must be trimme d to administrative capacity. It is particularly necessar to exc1ude
from the standard V AT structure the myriad of small business-people and farmers
who would find it impossible to keep adequate accounts. This measure wil
probably involve little revenue loss but considerable savings in costs of
administration and compliance. Experience also suggests that a V A T is introduced
most easIly when it replaces a cascade tax or some other general sales tax that has
already accustomed small firms of record-keeping. The extension of the existing
sales tax to this sector may therefore be a better alternative in Tanzania than
introducing a value-added tax.
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